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The consumption literature uses adult equivalence scales to measure individual level in-
equality. This practice imposes the assumption that there is no within household inequality.
In this paper, we show that ignoring consumption inequality within households produces mis-
leading estimates of inequality along two dimensions. First, the use of adult equivalence scales
underestimates the level of cross sectional consumption inequality by30%, as large differences
in the earnings of husbands and wives translate into large differences in consumption alloca-
tions within households. Second, the rise in inequality since the 1970s is overstated by almost
two-thirds: within household inequality declined over time as the share of income provided
by wives increased. Our ﬁndings also indicate that increases in marital sorting on wages and
hours worked can simultaneously explain virtually all of the decline in within household in-
equality and a substantial fraction of the rise in between household inequality for one and two
adult households in the UK since the 1970s.
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A recent literature has documented a large rise in consumption inequality in several developed
countries.1 Underlying these measures of inequality is the use of adult equivalence scales, which
are used to assign consumption levels to each member of a household. This has been necessary
as there do not exist comprehensive measures of individual level consumption for households with
more than one member. The drawback of this approach is that it implicitly assumes there is no
inequality among adults within the household. In particular, the use of adult equivalence scales
implies a very restrictive model of the household in which husbands and wives split consumption
equally, regardless of the source of the income.2
This equal division assumption is inappropriate in the study of consumption inequality, as a
large theoretical and empirical literature routinely rejects the assumption that the consumption
allocation does not vary with the source of income in the household (Browning, Bourguignon,
Chiappori and Lechene, 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori 1988, 1992; Chiappori,
Fortin and Lacroix, 2002; Donni, 2007; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997; Manser and Brown
1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981, among many others). Since there has been a sizable increase
in women’s wages and labour supply over the last half century, the share of household earnings
provided by the wife has changed substantially over time. If consumption allocations depend on
the source of income and the sources of income within households have changed over time, then
adult equivalence scales will produce an inaccurate picture of the trends in consumption inequality.
The goal of this paper is to document the trends in consumption inequality once within house-
hold inequality is taken into account. We construct and estimate a static model of intra-household
allocations to examine how changes in the source of income in the household translate into changes
1See Blundell and Preston (1998) for the UK, Pendakur (1998) for Canada and Barrett, Crossley and Worswick
(2000) for Australia. The evidence on consumption inequality in the United States is mixed. Slesnick (2001) and
Krueger and Perri (2006) do not ﬁnd a large rise in consumption inequality since the 1970s. Alternatively, Cutler and
Katz (1992) and Johnson and Shipp (1997) report a rise in inequality. Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2007) use
two sources of data on consumption and also ﬁnd consumption inequality was rising over time.
2Recently, there has been a substantial departure from this literature. Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006)
relax the assumption that household members split consumption equally in the construction of adult equivalence
scales. Hong and Ríos-Rull (2007) use information on the purchase of life insurance to estimate equivalence scales.in individual-level consumption allocations. In particular, we observe variation in labour supply,
total household consumption and wages for singles and married couples in the data. We use the
joint relationships between consumption, wages and labour supply for single households and be-
tween own and spousal wages in married households to infer the private consumption levels for
married men and women. The model is estimated on a sample of one and two person households
from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the years 1968 to 2001. Under relatively weak
identiﬁcation assumptions, the model allows us to infer the level of consumption allocated to each
member of the household, which is necessary for the measurement of individual level consumption
inequality.
We then use our estimates to construct a new measure of consumption inequality across indi-
viduals. We have two main ﬁndings. First, ignoring the potential for intra-household inequality
may underestimate individual-level consumption inequality by 30%, as differences in earnings
across husbands and wives generates substantial within-household inequality. Second, the rise in
consumption inequality reported in the literature is overstated by almost two-thirds. This result is
due to the fact that within household inequality has fallen over time as female wages and labour
supply have increased. An implication of our ﬁndings is that the equal sharing assumption implicit
in adult equivalence scales is valid only for households in which the wife has the same earnings as
her husband.
A recent literature examines several dimensions of the relationship between inequality and
household behavior. Kremer (1997) and Fernández and Rogerson (2001) consider the extent to
which increases in marital sorting cause increases in inequality. Fernández, Guner and Knowles
(2005) and Dahan and Gaviria (1999) present empirical evidence of a positive correlation between
sorting and inequality.3 Gould and Paserman (2003) consider whether male wage inequality has
a causal effect on marriage and ﬁnd that increases in inequality lead to reductions in marriage
rates. We contribute to this literature by providing evidence on the importance of several potential
3In this instance, the degree of marital sorting is measured by the correlation between characteristics such as
education across spouses.
2explanations for the rise in consumption inequality between households and the fall in inequality
within households since the 1970s in the UK. While changes in the demographic composition of
the population appear to play a limited role, an increase in marital sorting has profound effects on
the trends in consumption inequality. In particular, the rise in marital sorting on wages and hours
observed in the data has the potential to account for all of the fall in within household inequality
and at the same time can explain a large fraction of the rise in consumption inequality between
households.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the stylized
facts on consumption, wages and labour supply that provide the motivation for our study. Section 3
outlines the theoretical framework and the identiﬁcation strategy for estimating the rule to allocate
consumption to individuals within a household. Section 4 describes the data set and Section 5
the strategy for estimating the model. The estimation results are presented in Section 6. Sec-
tion 7 presents a decomposition of consumption inequality and considers the importance of several
explanations for the trends in consumption inequality. Section 8 concludes.
2 Trends in Consumption and Earnings Inequality in the UK
In this section, we outline the main stylized facts regarding consumption and income inequality
in the UK between 1968 and 2001. The data we use to conduct our analysis comes from the UK
Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The FES contains information on household consumption ex-
penditures and earnings over the period 1968 to the present. In the construction of the following
stylized facts, we restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 and eliminate stu-
dents, retirees and the self-employed. We are particularly interested in the following four features
of the data:
1. There has been a large rise in earnings inequality between individuals. Figure 1 documents
the trend in the Gini index for the distribution of individual and household earnings. The
Gini index for individual earnings has risen by 12% over the past 30 years. This rise in
3earnings inequality in the UK has been well documented in the literature (e.g. Blundell and
Preston, 1998).
2. Although earnings inequality between individuals is much higher than earnings inequality
betweenhouseholds, thelatterrosemuchmorerapidly: theGiniindexforinequalitybetween
households rose by 41% between 1968 and 2001.
3. As reported by Blundell and Preston (1998), there has been a corresponding rise in con-
sumption inequality. To account for economies of scale, we construct a standard measure of
individual-level consumption by dividing total household consumption by the square root of
household size. The Gini index for this measure of consumption is presented Figure 1. The
level of earnings inequality is higher than the level of consumption inequality but the rise in
inequality is higher for consumption than for earnings.
4. As illustrated in Figure 2, the correlation between the earnings of husbands and wives in-
creased dramatically over time. At the same time, the gender wage gap decreased and female
labour supply increased. Figure 3 highlights the dramatic change in the gender wage gap and
in women’s contribution to household labour income between 1968 and the present. The
dashed line represents the female’s share of potential income, deﬁned as the share of labour
earnings that would be contributed by the wife if both spouses worked full-time.4 The solid
line represents women’s share of actual household earnings. Overall, potential earnings of
wives increased by 13.5%, and women’s share of earnings in the household increased by
93% over the sample period. The latter partly reﬂects the increase in women’s wages rela-
tive to those of men, but also the large changes in female and male employment rates and
hours worked since the 1960s.
In summary, the evidence presented here highlights the fact that there has been a large rise in
earnings and consumption inequality between households while at the same time there has been a
4For households with missing wage data due to non-participation, we include a predicted wage based on a standard
selection-corrected wage equation. Results are available upon request.
4fall in inequality in the earnings distribution within households.
3 Model
In this section, we present a model that allows us to infer the level of consumption for each member
of a household. The model is based on Chiappori’s (1988, 1992) collective model of household
decision making.5 This framework is less restrictive than the model of equal division underlying
adult equivalence scales, as the only restriction on the intra-household allocation process is that
households reach Pareto efﬁcient allocations.
We modify the basic collective model along three dimensions to address several issues of rele-
vance to our analysis. First, to account for the lumpiness of labour supply observed in the data, we
allow individuals to choose zero, part-time or full-time hours of work.6 Second, we make a distinc-
tion between private and public consumption in the model. As public consumption is consumed
by both members of the household, ignoring the presence of public consumption may overestimate
the degree of inequality within households. We follow the strategy of Browning et al. (1994) and
partition all expenditures into either public or private expenditures. The goal of the estimation
exercise is to determine the allocation of private expenditures across household members.
Third, as in Vermeulen (2004) and Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we need to impose
additional restrictions on the collective model to identify the entire sharing rule. The question we
aim to address in this paper is whether measures of consumption inequality from the collective
model differ from measures in the literature based on standard equivalence scales. To answer this
question, we require an estimate of the full sharing rule to uncover the share of income allocated to
each household member for consumption. We assume that the sub-utility over private consumption
5See also Browning et al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002) and Blundell et al.
(2007).
6Blundell et al. (2007) model the labour force decision of the wife as continuous and of the husband as discrete;
either he works full-time or not at all. Donni (2003) considers the labour force participation decision and Vermeulen
(2004) considers the case where males are assumed to work full-time and females face a discrete labour supply choice
which includes the option of non-participation. As in our application, Vermeulen et al. (2006) treat the labour supply
decisions of both spouses as discrete.
5and leisure is the same when married as when single. In Section 6, we test whether this assumption
is supported by the data.
We start with a general description of the problem faced by single agents. We then describe the
intra-household allocation decision of married couples and the model restrictions that allow for the
identiﬁcation of the share of private consumption allocated to each household member.7
3.1 Singles
Assume all single individuals have preferences over leisure and consumption. For individuals of
gender g, denote discrete labour supply choices hg, hg ∈ H, leisure Lg, expenditures on private
consumption Cg, and expenditures on public consumption P g. The total time available is T, i.e.
hg = T − Lg.
Assume preferences for public consumption are separable from preferences over private con-
sumption and leisure. Denote total household non-labour income net of savings by Y g. After tax
labour earnings are denoted wg(hg), where the notation is chosen to reﬂect the progressive na-
ture of the tax system. Labour earnings includes all after tax income that depends directly on the
labour supply decision. In particular, wg(hg) includes unemployment insurance beneﬁts paid to
individuals who are not working. Single agents maximize utility by choosing labour supply and
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Using the separability assumption, we appeal to two-stage budgeting in which the individual






7Of course there are many aspects of the household’s problem that we do not address, including savings and risk
sharing behavior. See Mazzocco (2004, 2007) for work on these issues.






where yg = Y g − P g, hg + Lg = T, and hg ∈ H.
3.2 Married Couples
Consider a two member household, where each member has distinct preferences over own leisure,
own private consumption, and household public consumption. As with singles, we assume that
preferences over private consumption and leisure are separable from consumption of the public
good. Since public consumption is assumed to be consumed by both household members (P f =
P m = P), it is only necessary to uncover the sub-utility for private consumption and leisure
and the sharing rule to determine the share of consumption allocated to each household member.
Preferences over public consumption, which we do not estimate, are allowed to vary freely with
marital status.
Under the assumptions that preferences are egoistic and that allocations are Pareto efﬁcient, the
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where the Pareto weight, λ, represents the female’s relative bargaining power within the household.
The notation wf(hf,hm) accommodates the fact that, prior to 1990, the tax system in the UK is
progressive and based on household as opposed to individual incomes. As a result, after-tax wages
and non-labour incomes depend on the labour supply decisions of both spouses.
In the case without joint taxation, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) show that the intra-
household allocation problem faced by a husband and wife can be decentralized by considering
7a two stage process. In the ﬁrst stage the husband and wife decide on the level of public good
consumption (P) and on how to divide the remaining non labour income y = Y − P. The as-
sumption that utility from leisure and private consumption are separable from consumption of the
public good is key to allowing the allocation of public consumption to occur in the ﬁrst stage. The
joint taxation of incomes complicates the decentralization of the household problem.8 To address
this complication we deﬁne the conditional earnings for individuals of gender g, ωg(hg,hg0
∗ ), as
the after tax earnings of an individual working hg hours conditional on the actual labour supply of
spouse g0, hg0
∗ .
The household’s problem can then be decentralized as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, households
agree on an efﬁcient level of public goods expenditures and a sharing rule to divide the remaining
non-labour income. Deﬁne the sharing rule φ(y, ¯ ωf, ¯ ωm,z) as the amount of non-labour income
that is assigned to the wife. The sharing rule is assumed to depend on conditional earnings for
the wife and husband, ¯ ωf and ¯ ωm respectively, when both partners work full-time (40 hours per
week).9 The distribution factor, z, is a factor that inﬂuences the Pareto weight but does not directly
affect preferences. In the second stage, each household member chooses labour supply and private
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8We thank a referee for pointing out this issue. With few exceptions, e.g. Donni (2003) and Vermeulen (2006), the
literature on collective models ignores taxation.
9The reason the sharing rule is assumed to depend on potential earnings, as opposed to actual earnings, is that the
former is exogenous to the labor supply decisions of both spouses.
83.3 Identiﬁcation
Before discussing identiﬁcation, we select functional forms for preferences and the sharing rule.




























where the spousal age gap is introduced as a distribution factor. Wages enter the sharing rule
here as the female’s potential share of conditional earnings, when both spouses work full-time, to
capture the notion that relative earnings power is likely to inﬂuence the intrahousehold allocation
of resources.
As mentioned above, our primary interest is in allocating private consumption between the
household members. This requires that we obtain an estimate of the sharing rule φ(y, ¯ ωf, ¯ ωm,z).
Generically, this sharing rule is identiﬁed up to a constant (Chiappori; 1988, 1992). Our exercise
requires complete identiﬁcation of the sharing rule which requires an additional restriction. As in
Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2006) among others, we assume that some features of pref-
erences do not change following marriage. In particular, we assume the sub-utilities over private
consumption and leisure do not change following marriage: vg(C,L) = ug(C,L). The prefer-
ence parameters αg and ρg can then be identiﬁed using data on singles, if labour supply, wages,
and non-labour incomes for singles are observed. Given identiﬁcation of sub-utilities, the sharing
rule is identiﬁed as the share of household non-labour income that rationalizes the observed labour
supply choices of married men and women.
4 Data
The data we use comes from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES). This data is ideal for the
study of consumption inequality for three reasons. First, it contains detailed information on private
9and public consumption expenditures for households, on wages and labour supply for individuals,
and on demographics including age, education (from 1978 onward) and region of residence. Sec-
ond, the FES has fewer problems with measurement issues than the leading contenders in the US
and elsewhere.10 The FES uses a weekly diary to collect data on frequently purchased items and
uses recall questions to collect data on large and infrequent expenditures. Finally, the FES contains
information over the period 1968 to the present, which allows the study of changes in consumption
inequality over a long period of time.
Our sample contains single person households and couples without children.11 We restrict
the age range in the sample to individuals between the ages of 22 and 65 and eliminate students
and the self-employed. For robustness, households in which one of the individuals is in the top
one per cent of the wage distribution are also excluded. The resulting sample contains 87,668
individuals.12 Descriptive statistics for our entire sample are presented in Table 1.
We deﬁne consumption and non-labour income measures as follows. Total consumption is de-
ﬁned as total household expenditures. Public consumption is deﬁned as expenditures on housing,
light and power, and household durable goods. Private household consumption is total expendi-
tures net of public consumption. Other income is deﬁned as total household expenditures minus
net labour income. We use this expenditure based deﬁnition of non-labour income, as it is con-
sistent with the assumptions of a two stage budgeting process, time separable preferences, and
separability of public goods consumption from leisure and private consumption as in the model.13
To construct the level of consumption corresponding to each labour supply decision, including
zero hours, we need to assign an earnings level to all individuals. For those who are working we
10Battistin (2004) documents reporting errors in the US Consumer Expenditure Survey due to survey design.
11We exclude households with children in this paper to abstract from the intra-household allocation of resources
for children’s consumption. This is obviously an important issue. To this end, our estimates of the sharing rule and
the comparison of various inequality measures only apply to households without children. We leave to future work an
analysis of consumption inequality for the entire sample of households.
12The sample size in 1968 is 2,584 and the sample size in 2001 is 2,757. The sample sizes do not vary markedly
across years: the smallest sample is 2,502 in 1979 and the largest is 2,932 in 2000.
13In estimation, household expenditures on public goods are subtracted from other income, resulting in non-labour
income net of public goods consumption. In addition to the separability assumptions, wage proﬁles are assumed to be
exogenous. This rules out the possibility of job-speciﬁc human capital accumulation.
10use the usual hourly wage, deﬁned as weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. For non-
participants we use a predicted wage, computed based on a reduced form selection-corrected wage
equation. The log of the wage is estimated as a function of age, birth cohort, year, quarter and
regional dummies, plus the age at which full time education was completed and its square. The
selection equation is identiﬁed by the exclusion from the wage equation of household non-labour
income, marital status, and the age, education and the labour income of the spouse.14 After tax
earnings are subsequently computed by converting weekly wage income to an annual base, de-
ducting the appropriate personal allowance and then applying the appropriate tax rate. Personal
allowances and marginal tax rates are from the Board of Inland Revenue (1968–2001). All mone-
tary values are expressed in 1987 pounds. The resulting income measure is treated as known and is
used to construct the potential share of after-tax household labour income contributed by the wife,
¯ ωf/(¯ ωf + ¯ ωm). Individuals may also be entitled to income related to earnings when working zero
hours, for instance unemployment beneﬁts, so we also predict unemployment beneﬁts for those
who are working based on the Ofﬁcial Yearbook of the United Kingdom (1968-2001).
Labour supply is measured by a discrete variable that takes on three values: not participating,
working part-time and working full-time. Full time is deﬁned as working 35 hours per week or
more, and part-time is deﬁned as 1 to 34 hours per week. The choice of these ranges is based
on the hours histograms in Figure 4, which suggests a full-time deﬁnition of 35 hours a week or
more. The average hours worked in the part-time category is approximately 20 hours per week,
and approximately 40 hours per week in the full-time category.
In order to ensure consistency between the number of hours worked in each of the three states
and the corresponding consumption level we adopt the following convention. If an individual
is observed to be working either part-time or full-time we use the reported number of hours to
measure labour supply and usual take home pay in constructing consumption. In cases for which
we do not observe the labour supply state, we calculate after tax earnings based on 20 hours for the
part-time choice and 40 hours for the full-time choice. Constructing individual consumption in this
14Results are available from the authors upon request.
11way ensures our measure of total consumption in the household is consistent with that observed in
the data.
5 Econometric Speciﬁcation
We make the following additions to the model before estimation. First, we introduce several
sources of individual speciﬁc heterogeneity. We allow the weighting of private consumption rela-
tive to leisure to differ across individuals according to a set of demographic characteristics includ-





We also introduce additive unobserved individual heterogeneity in preferences ηih, speciﬁc to in-
dividual i and labour supply choice h
η
g
ih = νiLih + εih
which has two components. The ﬁrst component is a normally distributed, individual-speciﬁc
component which allows preferences over leisure to be correlated across labour supply choices,
and possibly with non-labour income (discussed below). The second component is i.i.d. type I
extreme value preference heterogeneity.
Second, we treat non-labour income as endogenous and measured with error. Much of non-
labourincomedependsonpastlabourincomeandthusmaybeendogenoustocurrentlaboursupply
decisions. To control for this potential endogeneity, we instrument nonlabour income using capital
gains in the local housing market (as in Hurst and Lusardi, 2004), a cubic in reported asset income
with time varying coefﬁcients, an indicator for positive net worth, a quadratic in age for both part-
ners, education for both partners and birth cohort dummies as instruments.15 Capital gains in the
housing market are measured by quarterly year-over-year changes in real house prices in each of
12 regions in the UK, interacted with a home ownership indicator. The estimating equation for
15We would like to thank a referee for this suggestion.
12nonlabour income for household i is
Yi = Wiβ + ²i (4)
where Wi is the above set of instruments. Predicted non-labour income ˆ Yi = Wiˆ β is used in place
of Yi and unobserved preferences for leisure, through νi, are allowed to be correlated with the
residual ²i. Finally, we set the total time endowment to T = 112 hours per week or 16 hours per
day.
Making use of these functional forms, along with the budget and time constraints, we can write
the value of labour supply choice h ∈ H for a single individual as
V
g
















































































where Z contains all relevant observables relating to both the individual and the choice and θ
contains all preference parameters and sharing rule parameters to be estimated.
Estimation proceeds in the following steps. First, we estimate a selection-corrected wage equa-
tion and predict wages for individuals that are not working, as described in Section 4. Second, we
estimate the reduced form equation for non-labour income to obtain the predicted non-labour in-
come ˆ Y and the residuals. Third, we obtain estimates of the preference parameters αg, ρg, and
σg
ν by estimating a mixed multinomial logit model for the discrete labour supply choice using the
subsample of single men and women. Lastly, we obtain estimates of the sharing rule parameters φ
by estimating a mixed multinomial logit model for labour supply using the subsample of married
13men and women (conditional on ˆ αg, ˆ ρg, and ˆ σg
ν).16 The reported standard errors are bootstrapped
to account for the multistage estimation procedure.
6 Estimation Results
We begin with estimates of the preference parameters, presented in Table 2. At the parameter
estimates the utility function is increasing and quasi-concave for all the data. The elasticity of
substitution ( 1
1−ρ) indicates the degree of substitutability between private consumption and leisure
is similar across gender, 1.64 for women and 1.58 for men. The share parameters are also quite
similar for women (0.2314) and men (0.2707) at the mean, with a larger share going to leisure than
private consumption, although the share parameter for males tends to vary across type to a greater
extent than for females. Males also display substantially more variation in unobserved preferences
over leisure, as indicated by the variance of ν. Finally, the results suggest that unobserved prefer-
ences for leisure are positively correlated, and to the same degree, with the unobserved component
of nonlabour income for both men and women.
We now turn to the estimates of the sharing rule parameters, the parameters that allow us to
infer the share of consumption attributed to each adult in the household. As discussed in Section 3,
under the assumption that the sub-utility over private consumption and leisure is the same for mar-
ried and single individuals, we can construct each of the sharing rule parameters independently
from the labour supply decisions of the wife and the husband. The sharing rule parameters re-
covered separately from the wife’s and husband’s labour supply decision are presented in the ﬁrst
and second columns of Table 3, respectively. The estimated sharing rule parameters constructed
16The contribution of an individual i to the likelihood function is the probability of observing individual i making











We partition θ into the set of preference parameters, θ0 = {α,ρ,σν} and the set of sharing rule parameters θ1 = φ.
Then ˆ θ0 = argmax
P
i∈S `i(h,Zi,θ0), and ˆ θ1 = argmax
P
i∈M `i(h,Zi,θ1|ˆ θ0), where S and M are the subsets of
single and married individuals, and `i(h,Zi,θ) = log(L(h,Zi,θ)).
14separately from the wife’s and husbands estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. In
both speciﬁcations, the positive sign on φ1 indicates that an increase in the female’s share of po-
tential earnings increases her share of net nonlabour income in the household. The estimates also
indicate that the spousal age gap has an economically and statistically insigniﬁcant effect on the
intra-household allocation.
The test statistics associated with several tests of the model predictions are presented in the
bottom four rows of Table 3. A Wald test on the full set of restrictions from the model does not
reject the model at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level, but does reject at the 10 percent level. We
also test whether each of the individual restrictions from the female’s problem are consistent with
the corresponding restrictions from the male’s problem. The test statistics indicate that none of
the model restrictions are rejected at the 5 percent level and that the restrictions on φ1 and φ2 are
not rejected at any conventional signiﬁcance levels. The marginal p-value for the restriction on
the intercept in the sharing rule may be evidence of an intercept shift in preferences following
marriage; unfortunately, it is not possible to separately identify such a shift in preferences and the
intercept of the sharing rule in our speciﬁcation. Overall, the test statistics provide some support
for our version of the collective model.
We next estimate a version of the model that imposes the across-spouse restrictions on the
sharing rule. The results of this exercise are presented in column three of Table 3. The estimates
suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of potential earnings attributed to the wife results in
a 24 percent increase in the share of non-labour income she receives. This result is consistent with
an increase in the wife’s threat point within a bargaining model.
6.1 Adult Equivalence Scales Revisited
One of the main goals of this paper is to determine whether measures of consumption inequality
using standard adult equivalence scales provide an accurate estimate of consumption inequality
across individuals. Recall, adult equivalence scales assume that husbands and wives share in
household consumption equally. In this section, we determine the conditions under which our
15model would yield the same measures of consumption inequality as measures using adult equiva-
lence scales. We set the age difference between spouses to the average age difference in the data.




= ˆ φ0 + ˆ φ1 ·
¯ ωf
¯ ωf + ¯ ωm + ˆ φ2 · (2.09).
Usingestimatesforφ0, φ1 andφ2 of−0.6645, 2.3670and0.0022, respectively, yields49%. Inother
words, the model predicts that consumption is split equally across the husband and wife when they
have the same earnings!17 It is worth emphasizing that this result is derived not from a model in
which equal sharing is assumed: the only assumptions imposed in estimation are that households
make Pareto efﬁcient decisions, that public consumption is separable from private consumption,
and that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption is the same
when single as when married.
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we consider the sensitivity of our results to both the sample used to estimate the
model and the robustness of our estimation results to several modiﬁcations. First, we consider
whether the trend in inequality measured in the literature for the entire population differs from
the trend for our sample of one- and two-person households. Upon examination of Figure 5, we
see that the trends in between household inequality using adult equivalence scales are virtually the
same across samples. Thus, it does not appear that our results are driven exclusively by trends
in inequality that are unique to our sample. That said, we are not able to say how the trends
in within household consumption inequality vary between our sample and the entire population
without estimating an extended version of our model.
With regards to the robustness of our results, the ﬁrst check we consider is whether the results
are sensitive to our deﬁnitions of public and private consumption. We ﬁrst estimate the model
17To be precise, husbands and wives will split consumption equally when they have approximately the same wages
and hours.
16under the assumption that there are no public goods and then sequentially add housing, heat and
lighting, household durables, transport and services to public good consumption.18 The results of
this exercise are reported in Table 4. The parameter estimates are quite robust across speciﬁcations:
an increase in the wife’s share of potential household earnings of 10% results in an increase in
her consumption share of between 14% and 15% and women receive between 51% and 58% of
consumption in households where both spouses choose the same hours of work and have the same
wage.
The next speciﬁcation we estimate allows for differences in the sharing rule parameters for each
birth cohort in our pooled sample. The sample covers a long time period and a wide age range in
every year; we thus estimate sharing rules for each ten-year cohort in the data. The parameter
estimates are presented in Table 5. There is some variability in the parameter estimates across
cohorts, but no clear trend across time. For the cohorts between 1910 and 1960, an increase in
the wife’s share of potential household earnings increases her share of non-labour income between
7% and 34% and the estimated effect of an increase in the husband’s age by one year fall within
the range of −0.3% and 0.2%. With the exception of 1960, the share received by women when
the husband and wife have the same earning potential is between 40% and 60%, with the share
received by women tending to decline for more recent cohorts.
7 Consumption Inequality
In this section, we compare the inequality measure implied by our model to a conventional mea-
sure of consumption inequality. We use this sharing rule to divide non-labour income between
the husband and wife in each household. We subsequently construct private consumption based
on the individual’s share of non-labour income and his or her personal net labour earnings from
each individual’s private budget constraint. Our sharing rule measure of individual consumption,
for married individuals, is then equal to individual private consumption plus household public
18Estimating the full model with unobserved heterogeneity is computationally demanding. For this reason the
results pertaining to the sensitivity to the deﬁnition of public goods are obtained assuming a degenerate distribution
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Single individuals consume their entire labour and non-labour income. For comparison purposes,
we construct another measure of individual consumption, equal division, which assumes that all
consumption is divided equally between the husband and wife. In the equal division case, in-
dividual consumption is calculated as household public consumption plus one half of household
private consumption. In both the sharing rule and the equal division case, we double count public
consumption. This accomplishes the same end as using an equivalence scale to assign household
consumption to individual members.19
Having constructed these two measures of individual consumption, we can construct a time
series of inequality measures and decompose them into changes in between and within household
inequality. While the Gini coefﬁcient is a well known and widely used inequality index, it does not
allow overall inequality to be exactly decomposed into within and between group contributions. As
this is one of the main objectives of this paper we also compute the Mean Logarithmic Deviation














where µC is the mean level of consumption. The index of total inequality using the MLD can be





19It should be noted that the correlation between our equal division consumption inequality measure and a measure
of inequality using equivalence scales is 0.99.
20The MLD is a member of the Generalized Entropy Class, the only class of additively decomposable inequality
indices (Shorrocks, 1984).
18where IW(C) is within household inequality and IB(C) is between household inequality. Under
the assumption of equal division, within household inequality is zero; therefore, we can calculate
IB(C) by using equal division. Using individual consumption constructed with the sharing rule
we obtain the total inequality index IT(C). We can then recover intra-household inequality using
Equation (6).
7.1 Between and Within Household Consumption Inequality
The time-series trend of total and between household inequality for the years 1968 to 2001 is
presented in Figure 6. The Gini index measures are presented in the ﬁrst panel and the MLD mea-
sures of inequality are presented in the second panel. Inequality was stable from 1968 to 1980 at
which time it increased substantially until around 1990 and has been falling slightly from 1990
through 2001. The compression of marginal tax rates appears to have played a role in generating
the sharp rise in between-household inequality during the 1980s. The top and bottom marginal tax
rates are plotted in Figure 7, where the top marginal rate falls from 83% in 1978 to 60% in 1979,
and then falls again to 40% in 1988. The increase in between household consumption inequality
is closely linked to the increase in after tax income inequality that occurred over the 1980s. Of
particular interest are two ﬁndings. First, ignoring intra-household inequality underestimates con-
sumption inequality in 1968 substantially. This is due to the large differences in earnings between
husbands and wives in 1968, differences that translate into an unequal distribution of consumption
in the household. It is not surprising that our measure of inequality in 1968 is higher than the
conventional measure: by deﬁnition, taking within household inequality into account will increase
total inequality. However, the magnitude of the difference is striking: consumption inequality, as
measured using adult equivalence scales, is underestimated by approximately 30% (15%) when
inequality is measured using the MLD (Gini index). To put this ﬁgure into perspective, the dif-
ference between the level of inequality in 1968 using our measure of inequality compared to the
conventional measure is as large as the entire increase in inequality between 1968 and 2001.
Second, the rise in consumption inequality under equal division, or between household inequal-
19ity, may be over-stated by almost two-thirds, as illustrated by the trend in the MLD presented in
Figure 8. The reason our measure of inequality is so different from the equal division measure is
due to the large fall in within-household inequality. The stylized facts presented in Section 2 point
to the two main reasons for the decline in within household inequality: the fall in the gender wage
gap and the rise in female labour supply. As women’s wages rose and as married women increased
their labour supply, the share of income contributed to the household by the wife increased. The
share of consumption allocated to wives increased accordingly.
Consider the distribution of consumption inferred from our model for 1968 and 2001 in Fig-
ure 9. The dispersion in within household inequality decreased between 1968 and 2001. The fact
that there was a high degree of dispersion in 1968 was a major contributor to the high level of in-
equality at the beginning of the sample period. Despite the fall in dispersion, the righthand panel of
Figure 9 shows that there is still a substantial deviation from equal division by 2001. Incorporating
within household inequality thus changes the picture of inequality dramatically.
7.2 Accounting for the trends in consumption inequality
In this section, we examine several explanations for the rise in consumption inequality observed
in the data. We focus on the years 1978 to 2001, as the major changes in inequality occurred over
the 1980s. Results are presented in Table 6. The ﬁrst two rows contain the benchmark inequality
measures for 1978 and 2001, followed by the absolute change over time in the third row. The rest
of the table presents the percentage of the change in the observed inequality measures attributed to
each explanation we consider.
7.2.1 Wages and Labour Supply
According to the stylized facts, two of the most salient trends over time are the closing of the
gender gap in wages and the rise in female labour supply. To what extent do changes in the
distribution of wages account for the rise in consumption inequality? To answer this question, we
conduct two exercises. In the ﬁrst exercise, we start with the wage distribution in 2000. We then
20re-weight the observations in the 1978 data so that the wage distribution in 1978 matches that of
2001. In particular, we construct histograms of log wages for 1978 and 2001. The histograms
used to re-weight the wage distributions have 10 bins each. We re-weight 1978 data so that the
histograms of log wages are the same in both years. This experiment captures the fall in the gender
wage gap and aggregate changes in the wage distribution. In the second experiment, we focus on
changes in the wage distributions within households. We re-weight the joint spousal distribution
of wages in 1978 to match the joint spousal distribution of wages in 2000 to capture the effect of
sorting on inequality. Both experiments are subsequently repeated for labour supply. The results
are presented in Table 6.
What is interesting about the results on wage and hours sorting is that they can simultaneously
explain both the rise in consumption inequality across households and the fall in consumption
inequality within households: sorting on wages alone can explain approximately 39% of the rise
in between household inequality and 64% of the fall in within household inequality. It is also
interesting to note that it is wage sorting within households in particular that is important, not
changes to the aggregate wage distribution, as changes to the aggregate wage distribution explain
little of the changes in inequality.
With respect to sorting on hours, 32% of the rise in between household inequality and 85%
of the fall in within household inequality can be explained by increased marital sorting. Over
time, the distribution of marriages shifted from ‘specialized’ families, with one income or a mix of
low and high earners within the household, to a distribution with a larger proportion of both high
earnings couples and low earnings couples. Regardless of the measure of consumption inequality
considered, the exercises conducted above illuminate the dramatic role of sorting in determining
the distribution of consumption across individuals. The evidence presented here is consistent with
the existing literature on marital sorting and inequality that ﬁnds a positive relationship between
marital sorting, on characteristics such as education, and inequality (Kremer, 1997; Dahan and
Gaviria, 1999; Fernández and Rogerson, 2001; Fernández, Guner and Knowles, 2005).
217.2.2 Demographics and Household Composition
Next, we consider the hypothesis that the rise in consumption inequality is capturing cohort effects
due to the changes in the age structure of the population. To this end, we re-weight the 1978 data
so that the age structure is the same as that in 2001, holding all else constant. The results of this
exercise, presented in the ﬁfth row of the bottom panel of Table 6, suggest that changes in the age
distribution between 1978 and 2001 had virtually no effect on consumption inequality. Thus, it
does not appear that cohort effects are the driving force behind the trends in inequality.
The second explanationwe consider is the largechange in household composition that occurred
alongside the rise in inequality. In particular, with delays in marriage and a rise in divorce rates,
the fraction of households with one adult increased relative to the fraction of two adult households.
Although single person households have no within household inequality by deﬁnition, it is still
the case that there may exist substantial inequality between single adult households. To assess the
importance of changing household composition, we re-weight the 1978 data so that the fraction
of married couples, the fraction of single women, and the fraction of single men in the population
match the proportions in 2001. The results of this exercise suggest that changes in household com-
position can explain up to 17% of the change in household inequality according to the sharing rule
estimates and 16% of the change in consumption inequality when measured using adult equiva-
lence scales. Together, a combination of a changing age distribution and the change in household
composition over time can explain 14% of the change in the MLD over time, most of this effect
coming through household composition. In summary, our experiments indicate that the main driv-
ing force behind the trends in consumption inequality are changes in marital sorting, not changes
in demographics. This ﬁnding reafﬁrms the fact that our understanding of consumption inequality
is incomplete when intra-household behavior is ignored.
228 Conclusion
The literature on consumption inequality has focused on the question of how changes in income
inequality translate into changes in consumption inequality at the level of the individual. In this
paper, we show that current measures of consumption inequality only reﬂect inequality at the
household level, as it is assumed there is no inequality within households. We provide evidence
that this assumption produces a very inaccurate picture of both the level and trend in consumption
inequality for two reasons. First, the large dispersion in incomes in the household are highly in-
consistent with equal division of consumption. When equal division is relaxed, there is substantial
inequality within the household. This suggests previous work underestimates the level of individ-
ual consumption inequality by 30%. Second, the earnings gap within households has closed over
the past 30 years, resulting in less inequality in the household over time. As a result, we estimate
that the rise in inequality documented in the literature is overstated by 65%. Our results show that
the conventional approach for measuring inequality is only appropriate for measuring inequality
for single individuals and for couples with the same earnings.
Our work highlights the fact that looking inside the household is as important as looking be-
tween households for the study of consumption inequality across individuals. What happens in the
household not only changes our estimates of the level and trend in inequality; it also changes our
understanding of the forces behind the trends. We ﬁnd that increased marital sorting on earnings
can explain both the fall in within household inequality and the rise in between household in-
equality over time. These results are complementary to those of Fernández and Rogerson (2001),
Fernández, Guner and Knowles (2005) and Dahan and Gaviria (2001), among others, on sorting
and income inequality and suggest an important avenue for further research.
23Table 1: Descriptive Statistics from the FES
Male Female
Single Married Single Married
1968 to 2001 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Age (22 to 65) 43.92 13.39 48.60 13.51 50.41 13.31 46.51 13.60
No hours dummy 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.35 0.48
Part time dummy 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43
Full time dummy 0.68 0.47 0.77 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49
Hourly wage 4.94 2.43 4.74 2.27 3.86 1.96 3.33 1.66
Total Expend. 118.37 99.10 192.51 129.48 99.53 75.63 192.51 129.48
Housing Expend. 39.57 41.62 59.61 62.93 39.07 37.91 59.61 62.93
Observations 10,958 31,871 12,967 31,871
Observed wages 7,663 25,208 7,271 20,291













1910 Cohort 0.6214 2.5868
(0.0176) (0.0084)
1920 Cohort 0.3903 1.5159
(0.0179) (0.0099)
1940 Cohort −0.4233 −1.2546
(0.0272) (0.0201)
1950 Cohort −0.7580 −1.5184
(0.0329) (0.0186)











1+Xiγ. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
25Table 3: Estimates of the Sharing Rule.
Wives Husbands Restricted
φ0 −0.7729 −0.3011 −0.6645
(0.1176) (0.2233) (0.0954)
φ1 2.5712 1.8491 2.3670
(0.2800) (0.5094) (0.2322)
φ2 0.0031 0.0027 0.0022
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0017)
φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.5237 0.5192 0.6291
(0.0521) (0.0580) (0.0726)
χ2(3) p-value














Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
26Table4: SharingRuleEstimatesUnderAlternativeMeasures
of Public Goods









2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.5354 0.5053
(0.0076) (0.0073)
% of Total Consumption 0% 17%
Public Goods (ii) Public Goods (iii)









2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.5053 0.5798
(0.0216) (0.0208)
% of Total Consumption 24% 56%
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
27Table 5: Sharing Rule Estimates by Birth Cohort.
Birth Cohort Birth Cohort
1910 φ0 −0.8375 1920 φ0 −1.0278
N : 12,211 (0.1162) N: 18,660 (0.6900)
φ1 2.8719 φ1 3.3587
(0.2968) (1.8565)
φ2 0.0012 φ2 0.0023
(0.0021) (0.0065)
φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.6010 φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.6564
(0.0773) (0.4725)
1930 φ0 −0.8417 1940 φ0 −0.2050
N: 16,219 (0.0722) N: 15,284 (0.0296)
φ1 2.8238 φ1 1.1935
(0.2198) (0.0812)
φ2 0.0017 φ2 0.0018
(0.0023) (0.0017)
φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.5738 φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.3955
(0.0475) (0.0249)
1950 φ0 −0.8660 1960 φ0 −0.0529
N: 11,692 (0.2538) N: 7,974 (0.0704)
φ1 2.6061 φ1 0.6802
(0.5621) (0.1692)
φ2 0.0005 φ2 −0.0031
(0.0068) (0.0054)
φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.4381 φ0 + 1
2φ1 + 2.09φ2 0.2807
(0.0623) (0.0507)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. N indicates the sample size for each birth cohort.
28Table 6: Decomposition of the Change in Between and
Within Consumption Inequality.
Gini Index Mean Logarithmic Deviation
Absolute Change Total Between Total Between Within
1978 0.332 0.285 0.196 0.137 0.059
2001 0.373 0.337 0.254 0.204 0.050
Change 0.041 0.052 0.058 0.067 -0.009
Percentage of change attributable to:
Wages 2.5 5.8 1.3 4.7 26.5
Wage Sorting 51.2 50.8 34.9 38.9 64.3
Labor Supply 38.5 36.3 23.7 27.1 48.6
Labor Supply Sorting 41.4 44.2 23.8 32.1 84.8
Age Distribtuion 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Household Composition 28.7 21.5 17.4 16.4 10.2









































1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Figure 1: Trends in the Gini index for earnings and consumption.
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Figure 2: Correlation in earnings across husbands and wives.
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Figure 3: Fraction of actual household earnings provided by wife.
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Graphs by year, Sex, and Marital Status
Figure 4: Histogram of usual weekly hours.
Note: Own calculation from the FES.
31All households
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Figure 5: Consumption inequality for all households and one- and two-adult households.
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Mean Logarithmic Deviation
Figure 6: Total and between household decomposition of consumption inequality trends.
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Figure 7: Bottom and top marginal tax rates.
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Figure 8: Relative changes in between and within household inequality trends.
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Wife’s Share of Consumption
Figure 9: Distribution of consumption inequality within households.
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